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Flexibility, Labour Retention and Productivity in the EU 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between internal flexibility, the employment of fixed-term 
contract workers and productivity in 27 European Union countries. Drawing on European 
Company Survey data, the paper assesses whether establishments that employ on a fixed-term 
basis experience higher productivity than their competitors and stronger labour productivity 
improvements over time. These issues are of importance, given the recent weakness of 
productivity growth in many EU member countries, the steps that governments have taken to 
relax rules relating to the employment of fixed-term workers, and the emphasis placed on 
contractual flexibility within the European Commission's flexicurity agenda. The paper finds 
that establishments that do not use fixed-term contracts enjoy productivity advantages over those 
that do. Establishments that employ on a fixed-term basis but retain workers once their fixed-
term contract has expired perform better than those that do not retain workers. The findings also 
show that establishments that pursue internal flexibility report both higher productivity than 
competitors and productivity increases over time. In addition, they are more likely to retain 
workers who have reached the end of a fixed-term contract. 
 
Key words: European Union, fixed-term employment, flexibility, labour utilisation, 
performance, productivity 
 
2 
 
 
Introduction 
European economies are continuing to experience the after-effects of the economic crisis that 
began in 2008. Although employment levels have recovered in some European Union (EU) 
member states, stubborn economic difficulties remain. Aside from the specific difficulties that 
have plagued those countries that suffered sovereign debt crises after 2008, strong economic 
growth in the EU has yet to re-materialise. In contrast to previous post-recession periods, 
productivity in most EU member states has failed to recover from the Great Recession. In an 
effort to reignite economic growth, national governments have implemented reforms intended to 
liberalise labour markets. In some EU countries the reforms have included a dilution of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) and increased freedom for firms to employ workers on 
a fixed-term basis. These reforms are intended to increase firms’ ‘numerical’ flexibility; in other 
words, to make it easier for employers to adjust the number of workers they employ and thus 
their labour costs.  
An alternative ‘internal’ approach to achieving ‘flexibility’ involves making adjustments to the 
organisation of work and the utilisation of workers within organisations (Martinez-Sánchez, 
Vela-Jiménez, Pérez-Pérez & de-Luis-Carnicer, 2011, p. 717). Such flexibility might be secured 
by practices such as flexible working time, creating teams composed of polyvalent workers and 
investments in education and training. While the European Commission has emphasised the 
potential of this form of flexibility to contribute to ‘high performance’ (e.g. European 
Commission, 2007), the focus of recent policy reforms has been predominantly on enhancing 
flexibility in relation to dismissals and the use of fixed-term contracts (Author B, 2015). 
This paper examines the implications of internal flexibility and the use of fixed-term contracts 
for company performance and suggests that recent attempts by some governments to make it 
easier for firms to dismiss workers and make use of fixed-term contracts are unlikely to unleash 
a substantial improvement in labour productivity. We show that firms that do not employ 
workers on fixed-term contracts, or that retain workers following the completion of fixed-term 
contracts, tend to enjoy a productivity advantage over those that employ, but do not retain, 
workers on fixed-term contracts. The paper draws on the 2009 European Company Survey and 
covers all 27 countries that were EU members in 2009. The paper begins with an overview of the 
labour market reforms undertaken by EU economies in the period since 2008. It goes on to 
review studies that have assessed the consequences of different approaches to flexibility for the 
performance of organisations. This is followed by a description of the research methods used for 
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the present paper and a presentation of our empirical findings. The paper concludes with some 
sceptical reflections on the current trajectory of labour market policy reforms in the EU.  
 
Productivity, flexibility and labour market reform 
In the hope of stimulating job growth and economic recovery after the 2008 financial crisis, 
governments in the EU have implemented substantial labour market reforms. Many of the 
reforms have been influenced by country-specific recommendations, issued by the European 
Commission since 2011 and based on annual reviews of the economic performance of each EU 
member state. The European Commission encourages EU member states to develop their labour 
market policies in ways that are consistent with its concept of ‘flexicurity’, defined as an 
‘integrated strategy to enhance, at the same time, flexibility and security in the labour market’ 
(European Commission, 2007: 10). According to the Commission, the introduction of greater 
contractual flexibility along with active labour market measures and increases in lifelong 
learning will promote employment, reduce the duration of unemployment and improve the 
prospects of labour market ‘outsiders’. Although greatest emphasis has been placed on labour 
market reforms aimed at increasing labour market flexibility and supporting workers’ transitions, 
the European Commission has also associated flexicurity with internal flexibility and high-
performance work systems (HPWS); the latter supposedly provides workers with more 
autonomy and a greater say in decision-making, continuous skill upgrading and flexible working 
patterns that might enable workers to achieve a reasonable work-life balance (European 
Commission, 2007). The evidence concerning the impact of internal flexibility on performance 
is mixed, but tends to suggest that functional flexibility and practices such as vocational training 
contribute to productivity improvements (e.g. Colombo & Stanca, 2014; Fay, Shipton, West & 
Patterson, 2015; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Konings & Vanormelingen, 2010). However, this 
does not necessarily imply positive outcomes for worker in terms of, for example, work 
intensity, job satisfaction and control of their jobs (Geary & Dobbins, 2001; Harley, Sargent & 
Allen, 2010).  
Despite the importance of internal flexibility to the flexicurity agenda and economic 
performance, the attention of policy makers continues to focus mainly on numerical flexibility. 
Since the start of the economic crisis, several countries, including France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Slovenia, have received specific recommendations aimed at increasing labour 
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market flexibility (Schömann, 2014, p. 15-18) and across the EU there has been a tendency for 
governments to dilute the strength of employment protection legislation (Author B, 2015). 
Reforms aimed at increasing employers’ freedom to make use of fixed-term contracts have also 
been widespread. Countries including the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Romania and Spain 
have increased the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts. Others, such as Poland and the 
Netherlands, have increased the number of permitted contract renewals (Clauwaert & 
Schömann, 2012). While reforms were generally intended to be time-limited anti-crisis 
measures, and were subsequently partially or wholly reversed in some countries (e.g. Spain and 
Slovakia), other countries have retained the measures and in some cases enshrined them in 
legislation (Lang, Schömann & Clauwaert, 2013).  
The consequences of fixed-term for productivity are a matter of debate. Some arguments focus 
on the impact of contingent workers on employees with regular contracts. One hypothesis in this 
vein is that productivity might increase if incumbent workers regard workers with fixed-term 
contracts as posing a potential threat to their jobs, thereby inducing them to work harder 
(Bryson, 2007: 132). Other arguments focus on the work effort and commitment of fixed-term 
employees and the potential for fixed-term employment to provide employers with a means of 
dealing with information asymmetries. Fixed-term jobs might offer employers a screening 
mechanism, enabling them to retain only those workers who they regard as being most 
‘productive’ (Autor, 2001; Portugal & Varejao, 2009). The prospect of permanence might 
encourage higher work effort on the part of temporary employees, which might have positive 
implications for productivity, particularly if workers believe the probability of permanence to be 
high (Engellandt & Ripahn, 2005; Ichino & Ripahn, 2005). However, other studies have argued 
that fixed-term employment can impact negatively on performance. Fixed-term workers tend to 
receive less training than those in standard employment and may not have time to develop the 
‘firm-specific skills’ of those in regular jobs (Bryson, 2007; Cutuli & Guetto, 2012). 
Furthermore, if fixed-term employees perceive that their chances of improving upon their 
current situation are poor, motivation may be negatively affected (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & 
Kalleberg, 2000; OECD, 2014). It is also possible that the presence of temporary employees will 
reduce the morale and effort of workers with permanent contracts (Davis-Blake, Broschak, & 
George. 2003; Battista & Vallanti 2013) and there can be difficulties in integrating non-standard 
employees into teams composed mainly of workers with regular contracts (Ward, Grimshaw, 
Rubery, & Beynon, 2001). To that extent, the use of fixed-term contracts might frustrate 
attempts to increase internal flexibility. Furthermore, there is evidence that numerical flexibility 
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can impede organisations’ ability to innovate, thereby damaging long-term performance (Michie 
& Sheehan 2003, 2005; Roca-Puig, Beltrán-Martín, Bou-Llusar, & Escrig-Tena, 2008). 
 
The consequences of fixed-term employment for productivity may also depend on the duration 
of contacts. Length of job tenure has been found to be positively associated with productivity, 
possibly because it leads to increased employee commitment and the creation of firm specific 
skills and knowledge (e.g. Dearden, Reed, &Reenen, 2006; Ng & Feldman 2010; 
Steffens,Shemla,Wegge, & Diestel, 2014). On the other hand, if tenure is extended as a 
consequence of fixed-term contracts being renewed, the affected workers may become 
demoralised and less committed (Saloniemi & Zeytinoglu, 2007), which might have negative 
implications for productivity. Much may depend on the extent to which temporary contracts act 
as ‘stepping stones’ to permanent jobs or ‘traps’ (Berton, Devicienti, & Pacelli, 2011). 
Transition rates to permanent employment vary considerably, being relatively high in Germany, 
Estonia, the Netherlands and Austria and relatively low in countries including Spain, France, 
Greece and Italy, where the share of involuntary temporary workers tends to be relative large 
(European Commission, 2014).  
Strong employment protection legislation (EPL) for workers with regular contracts is widely 
assumed to reduce the willingness of employers to hire on a permanent basis, encouraging them 
instead to use fixed-term contracts, which in turn contributes to segmentation of the labour 
market and the creation of a pool of labour market ‘outsiders’ (e.g. OECD, 2004; Muffels & 
Luijkx, 2008). However, the freedom of employers to make use of fixed-term contracts is 
limited by employment regulations relating to temporary jobs, which differ between countries in 
terms of the obligations and restrictions they impose. Furthermore, EPL is but one factor that 
might influence the propensity of employers to retain workers and offer permanent employment. 
Gash (2008) found that, despite having relatively strong EPL, routes to permanent employment 
were better in Germany than in France, the UK or Denmark. Gash suggested that this finding 
reflected the characteristics of Germany’s systems of industrial relations and vocational 
education training. It is also possible that company and workplace-level industrial relations 
practices and institutions will affect retention and transitions. Trade unions and other employee 
representatives might be expected to have an interest in the extent of fixed-term employment, 
how workers with fixed-term contracts are treated and the implications for their members’ job 
security and terms and conditions. Heery (2009) has argued that approaches to contingent labour 
by UK unions have included attempts to ‘exclude’ contingent workers, acceptance of them as a 
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group of ‘subordinate’ workers who can provide a ‘buffer’ that might help to enhance the 
security of core workers, and more positive responses that emphasise inclusion in union 
governance and engagement and that seek to improve the position of contingent workers (which 
might include seeking agreements on transitions to permanency). 
With these considerations in mind, we set out to address the following questions by examining 
data relating to EU 27 member states:  
(1) How do internal flexibility and use of fixed-term contracts affect labour productivity in 
the EU? 
 
(2) Does the retention of fixed-term contract workers have an impact on labour productivity? 
 
(3) What types of workplaces tend to retain workers after the completion of a fixed-term 
contract? 
Methods 
The study utilises data from the 2009 European Company Survey (ECS), which is a large-scale, 
Europe-wide survey of firms that covers the (then) EU-27 member states plus Croatia, 
Macedonia and Turkey.  The universe for the survey comprised all private and public sector 
organisations with 10 or more employees, excluding those in the agriculture and fishing 
industries, private households and extra- territorial organizations. A stratified random sampling 
method was employed so as to ensure representation across different sectors and establishment 
sizes. Larger enterprises were oversampled and a weighting procedure was subsequently used to 
correct the resulting disproportions. The ECS collected information about HRM practices, 
employment relations and establishment performance via national fieldwork agencies, which 
conducted Computer Assisted Telephone interviews with the most senior manager with 
responsibility for personnel matters and, where possible, employee representatives from the 
same organisations.  
 
Management interviews were conducted for 27,160 establishments, from a population of 3.2 
million. The survey was conducted between January and May 2009. In some countries a 
screening procedure was used to identify eligible establishments within multi-site companies. 
Response rates in countries in which the screening procedure was used ranged from 65% (Spain) 
to 17% (Hungary). In countries in which screening was not used response rates ranged from 11% 
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(the Netherlands) to 54% (Latvia) (further information is available in Eurofound 2011: 89-92). 
For the purpose of this study, we focused only on the 27 countries that were members of the EU 
at the time the data were collected. The total number of valid responses was 24,640 
establishments. The data have three distinctive strengths: a wide coverage of countries, 
harmonised data and sample homogeneity. In addition, there are very few missing data (the 
variable with the most missing data is the percentage of skilled workers, which is missing for 
223 out of 24640 (i.e. less than one per cent of) organizations. We adopted an available-case 
approach to deal with instances of missing data. 
 
As establishments are nested within countries and the information we are interested in was 
measured primarily at the ordinal level, we adopted a multilevel mixed-effect ordinal logistic 
modelling approach, which takes into account the dependent nature of the measurements at both 
establishment and country levels (Hox, 2010). The inclusion of 27 countries in the sample is 
sufficient to derive reliable estimates via a multi-level regression method (Bryan & Jenkins, 
2013). We used STATA 13 to estimate a model of labour productivity relating to comparative 
performance and another that related to performance when compared with the situation three 
years prior to the survey. For each outcome variable we included a contractual flexibility item to 
test the use of fixed-term contracts on labour performance (the findings are presented in Tables 4 
and 5). For those organisations that used fixed-term contracts, we also ran a multilevel 
regression to examine the potential determinants of retaining workers whose fixed-term 
contracts had expired (shown in Table 7). For all the models, we first ran an intercept only 
model and then proceeded to include organizational characteristics and other relevant control 
variables.  
A ‘variance of inflation factor’ test, which is a test to check for multicollinearity, was conducted 
on the pooled sample. The value in our model specifications ranged from 1.01 to 1.92, well 
below the threshold level of 10.0. The restricted maximum likelihood estimation method was 
employed. The deviance statistics (-2 Log likelihood) are also reported.  
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are as follows: 
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1. The labour productivity of establishments compared with that of other establishments in 
the same sector. 
  
2. The labour productivity of establishments compared to their productivity three years ago. 
  
3. Propensity of establishments to retain fixed-term workers.  
 
 
The values of the three dependent variables were measured using a four-point scale. In relation 
to the first item, managers were asked to assess whether labour productivity relative to other 
establishments was a lot better (16%), somewhat better (35%), about average for the industry 
(46%) or below average (2%). Because of the small number of respondents in the final category, 
the ‘average’ and ‘below average’ groups were merged. For the second dependent variable 
managers were asked to indicate whether labour productivity had increased considerably (22%), 
slightly (35%), remained about the same (30%) or decreased (13%). The third dependent 
variable measures retention of workers. Managers in the 14,167 establishments that used fixed-
term contracts were asked whether a follow-on contract had been given to all (24%), most 
(31%), some (23%) or none of those employees whose fixed-term contract had expired (42%). 
The coding of each of the dependent variables was reversed in the analysis, so that higher scores 
indicated better performance or retaining more workers. 
 
The first two variables reflect managers’ subjective assessment of labour productivity. It is 
common for studies of the relationship between HRM/employment relations and performance to 
rely on the subjective assessments of managers (e.g. Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Guthrie, 2001) 
and such assessments have been shown to accord well, although not perfectly, with objective 
measures (Wall,et al., 2004). Admittedly there are limitations in relying on self-reporting by 
individual managers and in the absence of ‘harder’ evidence relating to productivity it is not 
possible to verify the accuracy of their views.    
 
 Independent variables 
  
The analysis included the following independent variables: 
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Use of fixed-term contracts was measured by a categorical variable: (1) no fixed-term contracts 
(permanent contracts only or predominantly permanent contracts with some use of agency 
workers), 40%;  (2) employing fixed-term contract workers but retaining none after their 
contracts expired, 15%; (3) employing fixed-term contract workers and retaining some workers 
after the end of their fixed-term contract,13%; and (4) employing fixed-term contract workers 
and retaining most or all of them, 32%.  
 
We included a number of variables that were intended to capture information about aspects of 
‘internal flexibility’, as presented in Table 1. Here we examined practices that might support 
internal flexibility (such as training) or practices that represented a form of internal flexibility. 
The variables were as follows: Skilled work; Teamwork and Team autonomy; Check needs for 
further training; Time off for training; Flexible hours of work.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We included variables that were intended to capture the influence of national and establishment 
level labour institutions and industrial relations practices. Given the potential influence of EPL 
on the propensity of employers to employ on a fixed-term basis, we included measures of the 
strength of EPL for workers with regular contracts and with temporary contracts. These were 
taken from the OECD’s EPL index series. The scores for each country are provided in Appendix 
1, together with valid number of responses from establishments in each EU member state.  
The variables, from both employee representative and management questionnaires, relating to 
the presence of a formal employee representation body and the involvement of representatives in 
decisions relating to fixed-term workers include: Presence of a formal employee representation 
body;  Employee representatives’ influence on employment decisions ; Consultation of employee 
representatives on the use of FTCs; Employee representatives’ view of the relationship with 
management ; Managements’ view of the employee representation body.  These measurements 
are detailed in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Establishment size and sector were included as control variables, reflecting the survey design 
and the potential association between these variables and labour productivity (Eurofound, 
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2011).  When describing the use of fixed-term contracts across countries (see Figure 1), we take 
into account the establishment proportional weights. 
Establishment size: The establishment size categories, measured by the number of employees on 
the payroll, were 10-19 employees (26% of the sample), 20-49 employees (27%), 50-249 
employees (29%), and 250 and above (17%).  
Sector: The exploratory analysis (reported below) showed that the percentage of 
establishments that made use of fixed-term contracts did not vary a great deal across 
different sectors. We therefore included three broad business activity categories in the 
investigation of labour productivity (Table 3 and 4): manufacturing (40%); private services 
(39%) and public services (21%). The majority of these establishments were in the private 
sector (18, 777, accounting for 76% of the sample).  
Establishments that experienced structural changes in the past three years (such as a 
takeover, a relocation or the acquisition of another organization) were more likely to 
participate in the survey than those that had not experienced a change (Eurofound, 2011). 
Twenty-seven percent of the establishments in the sample had experienced changes. Such 
changes imply a period of uncertainty and instability, which might incline establishments 
to make greater use of fixed-term contracts.  
Findings 
We begin by examining the extent to which workplaces make use of fixed-term contracts. We 
also assess whether the propensity of firms to employ workers on fixed-term contracts varies by 
country, sector and establishment size. The most substantial difference in terms of using and 
retaining fixed-term contract workers (measured by establishments retaining most or all workers 
immediately after the expiration of their fixed-term contract) are by country and by 
establishment size. Based on the weighted data, Figure 1 shows the percentage of establishments 
by country that used fixed-term contracts as well as the percentage that had retained workers 
when their initial contract expired (this figure is based on those establishments that employed 
any workers on fixed-term contracts). Overall, 48% of establishments across the EU employed 
workers on fixed-term contracts. On average, establishments in the EU-15 employed a higher 
percentage of workers on fixed-term contracts (53%) than countries that joined the EU from 
2004 onwards (42%), although the percentage that retained workers was very similar (48% of 
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the former group and 50% of the latter). In some countries, specifically Germany, Finland, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, more than 
60% of establishments reported that they employed at least some workers on fixed-term contract, 
while in others, such as Austria and Cyprus, the proportion was less than one-fifth.  There was 
also cross-country variation in the propensity of establishments to retain workers. Among those 
EU member states that made heavy use of fixed-term contracts, more than two-thirds of 
establishments in Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia retained most or 
all fixed-term workers. By contrast, the percentage was less than 40% in Finland and France. On 
the other hand, almost 60% of the small proportion of establishments in Austria that made use of 
fixed-term contracts retained most or all workers.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
The use of fixed-term contracts increases with the size of the establishment. Almost half of all 
small establishments (10-19 employees) in the EU 27 reported using non-standard contracts. The 
equivalent proportion for firms with 500 or more employees was almost nine-tenths. In addition, 
we find that there are no substantial differences between sectors in terms of the proportion of 
establishments employing workers on fixed-term contracts. The lowest percentage was in the 
wholesale and retail sector (43%) and the highest in the professional, scientific and technical 
activity sector (56%). On average, 26% of all establishments retained most workers whose fixed-
term contract expired, ranging from 15% in the case of the information and communication 
sector to over 30% of establishments involved in professional, scientific and technical activities. 
The empirical analysis now turns to investigate the relationship between internal flexibility, 
fixed-term contracts and labour productivity. Regressions with and without post-stratification 
weights were conducted. The results were very similar and we have therefore based our 
regression analysis on the unweighted regressions, as recommended by Carle (2009). A 
preliminary correlation analysis is reported in Table 3. It shows that our various measures of 
internal flexibility are positively correlated with labour productivity. The employment of highly-
skilled workers is negatively correlated with the use of fixed-term contracts. Establishments that 
systematically check the training needs of workers with fixed-term contracts and that offer time-
off training are more likely to retain workers whose fixed-term contracts have expired. Retention 
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of workers is positively correlated with higher labour productivity and increases over time. 
Organizations that experienced major changes were more likely to undertake internal changes.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Since establishments are nested within countries we carried out multiple level analyses with 
establishments at level 1 and countries at level 2.  As can be seen in Step 1 of Tables 4 and 5, 
there is substantial variance between countries in terms of managers’ evaluation of labour 
productivity (12% and 6%), but the most important sources of variation are at the level of the 
organisation. We then examine the potential impact of fixed-term contract usage on labour 
performance and the relevant findings are reported in steps 2 and 3 in each of the Tables. We 
also investigated the potential impact of labour utilisation practices on establishment 
performance by size (steps 4 and 5) in each Table.  
  
After controlling for organization size and sector, the findings for the whole sample in both steps 
2 and 3 indicate that practices that might support or indicate internal flexibility, such as a high 
proportion of highly-skilled workers, team autonomy, training check and flexible hours of work, 
are positively and significantly associated with managers’ evaluations of labour productivity 
relative to competitors and also with their assessment of labour productivity increases over time.  
  
Step 3 of Table 4 shows that establishments that either employed no fixed-term contract 
workers, or employed them and retained most or all of them after the end of the fixed-term 
contract, performed significantly better in terms of relative labour productivity when compared 
to those establishments that employed workers on fixed-term contracts and did not retain them. 
The findings in steps 4 and 5 confirm that retaining workers after the end of their fixed-term 
contract makes a significant contribution to labour productivity, especially among SMEs.    
  
  Step 3 of Table 4 shows that establishments that employed workers on fixed-term contracts and 
retained them were significantly more likely to experience labour productivity improvements 
over time than those establishments that did not retain workers. Again the findings in steps 4-6 
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confirm that retaining workers after the end of their fixed-term contract makes a significant 
contribution to labour productivity increases, particularly among SMEs.   
 
TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
  
In addition, the study explored influences on establishments’ propensity to retain workers whose 
fixed-term contracts had expired. This part of the analysis includes only those workplaces that 
employed workers on fixed-term contracts, which means that the sample was reduced to 14,167 
establishments.  
To assess the influence of formal employee representation on the willingness of establishments 
to retain workers at the end of their fixed-term contract, we included the variables listed in Table 
2. The variables were extracted from the survey of employee representatives and the survey of 
managers in an attempt to minimise the common method bias. The correlations between these 
variables are show in Table 6. They confirm the consistency of mutual rating, reflected in a 
significant correlation between management’s positive view of employee representation bodies 
and employee representative’s positive view of the relationship with management (p<0.01).  
 
TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Step 1 in Table 7 shows that there is substantial variation (34 percent) between countries in 
terms of establishments’ propensity to retain workers. In Step 2 we include establishment and 
country-level control variables. For the former, we include variables which relate to employment 
relations; for the latter, we include measures of the strength of EPL for regular and temporary 
workers. In Step 3, we include variables that relate to internal flexibility practices.   
Step 2 suggests that good relations between management and formal employee representation 
bodies are positively and significantly correlated with the propensity to retain most fixed-term 
employees. This finding holds for both management’s positive perception of the benefits of 
involving employee representatives and the representatives’ belief that both management and 
employee representatives make sincere efforts to solve problems. However, the involvement of 
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employee representatives in the creation of rules and procedures relating to fixed-term workers 
appears to have a negative, but statistically insignificant association, with retention. The ability 
of employee representatives to influence employment and HR decisions is positively associated 
with retention, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. The findings also show that 
the strength of EPL for regular contracts is negatively correlated with the propensity of firms to 
retain workers and that the EPL index for temporary contracts is positively correlated with 
retention. However, neither finding is statistically significant. 
In Step 3 we see that establishments that systematically checked the training needs of workers 
with fixed-term contracts; provided those workers with time off for training, or emphasized team 
work were more likely to retain workers once their fixed-term contract came to an end. The 
association between managers’ views regarding the benefits of employee representation and the 
propensity to retain fixed-term workers is no longer significant. Employee representatives’ view 
of management continues to be statistically significant, but the findings suggest that the 
dominant influences are those that are related to the organisation of work and the skill 
requirements of the organisation. Those establishments that were most likely to retain workers 
were those with labour utilisation practices associated with internal flexibility. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided an investigation of the relationship between fixed-term employment and 
productivity that encompasses almost the entire EU. It has demonstrated that establishments that 
employ no workers on fixed-term contracts tend to perform better in labour productivity terms 
than those that employ on a fixed-term basis. Poorer performance is particularly evident among 
those establishments that renew the contracts of few or no workers once their fixed-term contract 
has come to an end. Establishments that renew most contracts tend to perform better. The 
finding points to the importance of continuity in employment and job security, which the 
European Commission has tended to regard as an outmoded policy goal, emphasising instead the 
need to enhance employment security via policy measures consistent with the principles of 
flexicurity (European Commission, 2007). 
Since the financial crisis of 2008 many EU countries have taken steps to increase employers’ 
freedom to hire workers on a fixed-term basis and also to make dismissals. The intention of 
policy makers has been to reduce unemployment and stimulate economic recovery. To date, 
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however, labour market liberalisation in the EU has failed to make an appreciable impact on 
unemployment, which has continued to increase in many of the countries that have gone furthest 
in implementing reforms (Author B, 2015). Furthermore, the evidence we have presented in this 
paper suggest that the long-term performance of these economies will not be improved by 
encouraging a greater use of fixed-term employment. Workers with fixed-term contracts receive 
less employer-funded training than permanent employees, which may make them relatively less 
productive and also affect their chances of moving into more secure employment (Forrier & 
Sels, 2003). Evidence from a number of EU countries suggests that temporary jobs can serve as 
career traps rather than stepping stones (Korpi & Levin, 2001; Scherer, 2004) and it is clear that 
young workers in particular are facing longer and more complex education-to-work transitions, 
involving increasingly differentiated trajectories and less security than in the past (Green, 2013). 
Although our paper relies on cross-sectional data and we cannot, therefore, draw conclusions 
about causality, our findings nevertheless complement those of other studies (for example, 
Colombo & Stanca, 2014; Fay et al., 2015) in demonstrating that establishments with practices 
related to internal flexibility tend to perform better than those in which such practices are absent. 
Although rarely foregrounded by the European Commission, internal flexibility is also a facet of 
its flexicurity agenda, albeit one that has largely been treated as separate to contractual 
flexibility. Our findings, however, indicate that the two forms of flexibility are related in that 
labour utilisation practices associated with internal flexibility are likely to encourage 
establishments to retain workers following the completion of their fixed-term contract. This 
might reflect the extent to which fixed-term workers become embedded in teams and develop 
forms of firm-specific skills and knowledge that cannot easily be replaced by hiring from the 
external labour market. One limitation of the ECS survey data, however, is that there is no way 
of knowing how many retained workers were offered a permanent contract upon completion of 
their fixed-term contract, as opposed to a further fixed-term contract. While some government 
have reformed fixed-term work regulations to permit additional renewals of fixed-term contracts, 
this will serve to perpetuate job insecurity and greater attention therefore needs to be paid to 
building pathways to permanent contracts. In general, efforts by policy makers to improve 
transitions have focused on reducing the strength of EPL, yet our analysis found that across the 
EU the association between EPL and the readiness of employers to retain workers following the 
completion of a fixed-term contract was statistically insignificant. This does not mean that EPL 
has no influence on employer perceptions and behaviours concerning the contractual mixes that 
they use and the relationship between EPL for regular and temporary employment and its effects 
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on firms located in particular sectors and countries are issues that would benefit from further 
research. However, in line with Gash (2008), we suggest that pathways to permanence are likely 
to be influenced by the interplay of institutions and practices at national, sectoral and 
establishment levels and those government policies that target EPL alone are unlikely to support 
transitions to more secure employment.  
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Table 1: Labour flexibility variables 
 
Variable measurement Percentage Number of valid 
cases 
(n=24,640) 
Use of fixed-term contracts    
Permanent contract only 40% 24,640 
Use fixed-term contracts, none was renewed 15% 24,640 
Use fixed-term contracts, some were renewed 13% 24,640 
Use fixed-term contracts, most or all were renewed 32% 24,640 
Internal flexibility    
The percentage of skilled workers  25% 24,417 
Work organized in teams (1=yes, 0=no) 64% 24,640 
Team granted autonomy (1=yes, 0=no) 24% 24,640 
Check needs for further training1 (1=yes, 0=no) 52% 24,640 
Time off for training: Employees were given time off to undergo 
further training in the past 12 months (1=yes, 0=no) 
62% 24,640 
Flexible hours of work: Percentage of workforce that is entitled to 
make use of flexible working time 
31% 24,640 
 
                                                            
1
 Only one-third of these establishments systematically checked the training needs of employees 
with a fixed-term contract. The analysis in Tables 3 and 4 includes all employees. In Table 6, only 
training checks in relation to fixed-term employees are included. 
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Table 2 Influence of formal Employee Representation body on labour utilisation 
Variable measurement Mean 
/percentage 
Number of 
valid cases 
(n=14,755) 
Presence of a formal employee representation body: a range of options, 
reflecting the enterprise-level industrial relations institutions that are typical 
in their country of operation (1=yes, 0=no). 
51% 14,775 
Employee representatives’ influence on employment decisions: employee 
representatives indicate the strength of the influence of employee 
representation on management decisions in relation to ‘employment and 
human resource planning’ (1 = very weak to 4 = very strong)  
3.28 4,679 
Consultation of employee representatives on the use of FTCs: employee 
representatives were asked whether or not had been involved in establishing 
rules and procedures for fixed-term contracts, either via consultation or 
negotiation (1=yes, 0=no).  
11% 14,755 
Employee representatives’ view of the relationship with management: 
employee representatives were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with the statement ‘management and employee representation make 
sincere efforts to solve common problems (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree). 
2.33 4,571 
Managements’ view of the employee representation body: managers were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement 
‘employee representation helps us in a constructive manner to find ways to 
improve workplace performance’ (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree). 
3.61 9,008 
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Table 3: Correlations between main variables in Table 4 and 5 
Variables Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Higher Productivity  3.62 0.83 1           
2. Increased Productivity  3.54 1.20 0.25** 1          
3.Retain FTC workers 3.34 1.41 0.05** 0.05** 1         
4. Percentage of workforce defined as skilled 0.25 0.29 0.10** 0.09** 0.00 1        
5.Train permanent workers 0.68 0.46 0.07** 0.10** 0.01 0.14** 1       
6.Train FTC workers 0.36 0.47 0.09** 0.07** 0.16** 0.11** 0.47** 1      
7. Time-off for training 0.62 0.48 0.06** 0.08** 0.06** 0.11** 0.22** 0.18** 1     
8. Flexible hours 0.31 0.40 0.06** 0.05** -0.00 0.17** 0.07** 0.04** 0.07** 1    
9. Team autonomy 0.20 0.40 0.07** 0.06** 0.00 0.08** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.09** 1   
10. Major changes 0.27 0.44 0.06** 0.06** 0.04** 0.04** 0.06** 0.08** 0.07** 0.02** -0.00 1  
11. Internal changes 0.60 0.48 0.05** 0.08** 0.00 0.04** 0.12** 0.09** 0.12** 0.08** 0.02** 0.45** 1 
Note: * p<0.05; **p<0.01(weight based on establishment) 
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Table 4: Labour productivity compared with that of competitors 
Dependent variable: a lot higher labour 
productivity 
Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) 
 
Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) 
Fixed effect (Establishment level) Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Use of fixed-term contracts flexibility Intercept only   250+ 10-249 
Compared with no FTCs  were renewed       
Permanent only    0.14(0.04)*** 0.13(0.12) 0.17(0.05)*** 
Some are renewed   -0.06(0.02) -0.11(0.11) -0.02(0.02) 
Most or all are renewed    0.12(0.04)*** 0.10(0.10) 0.14(0.04)*** 
Internal flexibility      
Percentage of workers that are skilled  0.46(0.05)*** 0.47(0.05)*** 0.39(0.14)*** 0.49(0.05)*** 
Having time off for training  0.11(0.02)*** 0.11(0.03)*** 0.18(0.08)** 0.11(0.03)*** 
Percentage of workforce with flexible hours  0.14(0.03)*** 0.14(0.03)*** 0.04(0.09) 0.16(0.04)*** 
Having team autonomy  0.24(0.03)*** 0.24(0.01)*** 0.35(0.08)*** 0.21(0.04)*** 
Having incentive pay  0.23(0.03)*** 0.23(0.03)*** 0.14(0.07)** 0.24(0.03)*** 
Establishment characteristics      
Experienced major changes   0.14(0.04)*** 0.14(0.01)*** 0.03(0.03) 0.15(0.03)*** 
Internal changes   0.12(0.03)** 0.13(0.01)*** 0.18(0.07)** 0.13(0.03)** 
Establishment size (base group: 10-19)      
20-49  0.01(0.03) 0.02(0.03)  0.01(0.04) 
50-249  -0.08(0.03)** -0.06(0.03)*  -0.07(0.04)** 
250-499  -0.12(0.05)** -0.09(0.05)* -0.11(0.06)*  
500+  -0.08(0.06) -0.05(0.06)   
Sector (base: manufacturing)      
Private service  0.18(0.03)*** 0.18(0.03)*** 0.22(0.07)*** 0.17(0.03)*** 
Public service  0.23(0.04)*** 0.25(0.04)*** -0.19(0.09)** 0.36(0.04)*** 
Random effect (variance components)      
Country level (intercept) 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.11 
Establishment level (Residual)      
Threshold  1 -0.07(0.07) 0.47(0.07) 0.58(0.08) 0.38(0.16) 0.63(0.08) 
Threshold 2 1.66(0.07) 2.24(0.08) 2.35(0.08) 2.27(0.17) 2.39(0.08) 
      
-2*Log pseudo likelihood 21941.34*2 21537.02*2 21522.38*2 3764.32*2 17723.64*2 
Number of establishments 21,952 21,807 21,807 3,840 17,967 
Chibar2 598.25 544.06 492.63 125.81 373.92 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Table 5: Labour productivity compared with three years ago 
Dependent variable:  increased labour 
productivity 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
Fixed effect (Establishment level) Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
 Intercept only   250+ 10-249 
Compared with no FTCs were renewed       
Permanent only    -0.05(0.04) 0.04(0.11) -0.05(0.04) 
Some are renewed   -0.04(0.04) -0.05(0.10) -0.03(0.05) 
Most or all are renewed    0.11(0.02)*** 0.03(0.09) 0.15(0.04)*** 
Internal flexibility      
Percentage of workers that are skilled  0.43(0.05)*** 0.42(0.05)*** 0.28(0.12)** 0.43(0.05)*** 
Having time off for training  0.20(0.01)*** 0.30(0.01)*** 0.19(0.07)** 0.19(0.03)*** 
Percentage of workforce with flexible hours  0.11(0.01)*** 0.11(0.01)*** 0.04(0.04) 0.12(0.03)*** 
Having team autonomy  0.21(0.03)*** 0.20(0.03)*** 0.24(0.08)*** 0.19(0.03)*** 
Having incentive pay  0.25(0.03)*** 0.24(0.03)*** 0.22(0.06)*** 0.25(0.03)*** 
Establishment characteristics      
Experienced major changes  0.20(0.03)*** 0.20(0.03)*** 0.14(0.07)** 0.20(0.04)*** 
Internal changes   0.36(0.03)*** 0.35(0.03)*** 0.38(0.07)*** 0.35(0.03)*** 
Establishment size (base: 10-19)      
20-49  0.12(0.03)*** 0.11(0.03)*** - 0.10(0.03)*** 
50-249  0.15(0.03)*** 0.12(0.03)*** - 0.11(0.03)*** 
250-499  0.25(0.05)*** 0.21(0.05)*** -0.13(0.05)** - 
500+  0.31(0.05)*** 0.27(0.05)*** - - 
Sector (base: manufacturing)      
Private service  0.11(0.01)*** 0.11(0.01)*** 0.00(0.03) 0.13(0.03)*** 
Public service  0.24(0.02)*** 0.23(0.02)*** -0.01(0.04) 0.31(0.04)*** 
Random effect (variance components)      
Country level (intercept) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Threshold 1 -1.95(0.05) -1.14(0.06) -1.17(0.06) -1.89(0.14) -1.11(0.07) 
Threshold 2 -0.31(0.04) 0.55(0.06) 0.52(0.06) -0.02(0.12) 0.56(0.07) 
Threshold 3 1.26(0.05) 2.18(0.06) 2.15(0.06) 1.71(0.14) 2.17(0.07) 
-2*Log pseudo likelihood 30593.94*2 29853.24*2 29837.39*2 5050.45*2 24763.51*2 
Number of establishments 23239 23,088 23,088 4029 19059 
Chibar2 377.29 376.02 349.46 43.13 284.35 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Table 6: Correlations between main variables in Table 7 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Retaining fixed-term contract workers 1      
2 Presence of a formal employee representation body 0.01 1     
3 Consultation of employee representatives on the use of FTCs 0.01 0.33** 1    
4 Employee representatives’ influence on employment decisions 0.00 -0.01 0.19** 1   
5 Managements’ view of the employee representation body -0.00 -0.01 0.04** 0.11** 1  
6 Employee representatives’ view of the relationship with 
management 
0.03* -0.00 0.12** 0.32** 0.14** 1 
Note: *p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Influences on the decision to retain fixed-term contracted workers 
Dependent variable: retain all fixed-term contract workers  Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) 
Fixed effect (Establishment level) Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Internal flexibility Intercept only   
Percentage of workforce defined as skilled   0.08(0.10) 
Check training needs for employees with fixed term contract   0.47(0.05)*** 
Provided time off for training in past 12 months   0.13(0.07)** 
Compared with no team work (base group)    
Having team work   0.21(0.08)** 
Having team autonomy   0.18(0.10)** 
Employment relations    
Presence of a formal employee representation body  0.03(0.01) 0.09(0.34) 
Employee representation influence on employment and HR planning  0.03(0.04) 0.03(0.04) 
Managements’ view of the employee representation body  0.03(0.01)** 0.01(0.01) 
Consultation of employee representatives on the use of FTCs  -0.04(0.02) -0.03(0.06) 
Employee representatives’ view of the relationship with management  0.06(0.03)* 0.06(0.03)* 
EPL for regular contracts  -0.01(0.11) -0.01(0.18) 
EPL for temporary contracts  0.09(0.12) 0.11(0.12) 
Establishments Size(base:10-19) (in five categories)  
  20-49 
 
 0.06(0.13) 0.04(0.13) 
50-249  0.24(0.12) 0.16(0.12) 
250-499  0.26(0.13) 0.13(0.13) 
500+  0.29(0.13) 0.15(0.13) 
Sector (base: manufacturing)    
Private services  0.24(0.06)*** 0.22(0.07)*** 
Public services  0.25(0.06)*** 0.17(0.07)*** 
Random effect (variance components)    
Country level (intercept) 0.34 0.37 0.35 
Threshold 1 -1.31(0.11) -0.32(0.85) 0.11(0.84) 
Threshold 2 -0.16(0.11) 1.07(0.85) 1.53(0.84) 
Threshold 3 1.29(0.11) 2.78(0.86) 3.25(0.84) 
-2*Log pseudo likelihood 18953.15*2 5783.44*2 5694.78*2 
Number of establishments 14,167 4,408 4,373 
Chibar2 1067.66 302.80 259.35 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: % establishments using FTCs and % of establishments renewing FTC 
workers’ contracts by country (weighted data) 
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Appendix 1: Number of respondents and EPL index scores 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
Sample size in 2009 
 
 
 
EPL for Regular contract 
 
 
 
EPL for Non-standard Contract 
 
 
Belgium 1,016 2.95 2.42 
Denmark 1,023 2.35 1.8 
Germany 1,500 3.09 1.54 
Greece 1,005 2.85 3.17 
Spain 1,509 3 3.5 
Finland 1,000 2.17 1.88 
France 1,500 2.82 3.76 
Ireland 503 1.98 0.71 
Italy 1,502 3.03 2.71 
Luxembo
urg 
501 2.74 3.83 
Netherlan
d 
1,002 2.88 1.17 
Austria 1,016 2.44 2.17 
Portugal 1,012 3.69 2.29 
Sweden 1,001 2.52 0.79 
UK 1,510 1.71 0.42 
Bulgaria 502 3.1 4 
Cyprus 505 2.17 0.3 
Czech 
Republic 
1,014 2.79 1.88 
Estonia 500 2.78 2.29 
Hungary 1,045 2.27 1.92 
Latvia 509 2.69 1.79 
Lithuania 560 2.79 2.5 
Malta 349 2.5 2.5 
Poland 1,500 2.39 2.33 
Romania 500 1.5 4.5 
Slovakia 520 2.64 2.17 
Slovenia 536 2.7 2.5 
Note: Most of the EPL scores are from the OECD and relate to 2009. The 2009 EPL scores for Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
and Romania are derived from the ILO’s EPLex database.  
 
 
